Florida Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 3

Article 6

September 1958

Full Faith and Credit for Child Custody Decrees
Robert J. Boylston

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Boylston, Full Faith and Credit for Child Custody Decrees, 11 Fla. L. Rev. 337 (1958).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Boylston: Full Faith and Credit for Child Custody Decrees
NOTES
educational expenses of a professional singer 45 and a mechanic46 were
disallowed. There is, of course, great doubt as to whether these expenses would still be disallowed under the new regulations and recent
case holdings.
In the light of the issuance of the final regulations as they pertain
to allowable deductions for voluntarily incurred educational expenses,
there seem to be few remaining problems as to their proper allowance
if the courts will give a realistic interpretation to T.D. 6291. The
Hill case could have just as adequately accomplished the same result
eight years earlier if the Treasury Department and the Tax Court
had not elected to interpret it narrowly.
This is certainly not to imply that there are no remaining issues
worthy of litigation. Although the regulations go a long way toward
a reasonable and logical matching of costs with the revenues they
produce, it has not completely remedied every malady which besets the
field of educational expenses particularly or the field of deductions
generally.
JAMEs L. ADE
THOMAS S. BIGGS, JR.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD CUSTODY DECREES
Article IV, section 1, of the United States Constitution as implemented by Congress' requires that judicial proceedings of each state
shall have the same full faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States that they have in the courts of the state
from which they are taken. This note is concerned with the extent
to which the requirements of full faith and credit are applicable to
child custody proceedings.
Some state courts have held that the full faith and credit clause
does not apply to child custody decrees. 2 The Kansas Supreme Court
3
has stated:
45T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926).
46Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950).
128 U.S.C. §1738 (1952).
23achman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956); In re Bort, 25 Kan.
215, 37 Am. Rep. 255 (1881) (by implication); State ex reL. Rasco v. Rasco, 139
Fla. 349, 352, 190 So. 510, 511 (1939) (dictum).
3Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 224, 285 Pac. 606, 616 (1930).
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"As between the parents themselves, they may be bound by a
former adjudication .

.

. but the state, in its relation of parens

patriae, looks to the welfare of the child at the time the inquiry is being made, and for that purpose former adjudications
between parents is [sic] evidentiary only and not controlling."
The reasoning is that the duty of the state as parens patriae to provide for the welfare of its citizens supersedes the claim of a child
custody decree to full faith and credit. A majority of the state courts,
however, hold that the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit
does apply to child custody decrees. 4 The United States Supreme
Court has not specifically ruled on this point but would probably
agree with the majority view.5
Assuming the applicability of the full faith and credit clause,
two main requirements must be met before this type of decree is
entitled to interstate recognition: (1) the court that rendered the
decree must have had jurisdiction,6 and (2) there must have been
no change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of the
decree by the court of the sister state in which enforcement is sought7
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT RENDERING THE DECREE

The first problem to be resolved in determining whether the
court that rendered the decree had the necessary jurisdiction is
whether a child custody proceeding is an in personam or an in rem
action. Many state courts have held that the proceeding is in the
nature of an in rem action, the child being the res over which the
court must have jurisdiction.8 Others have held that the child need
not be within the state; the presence of the parents before the court
is sufficient." The United States Supreme Court has held that a court
4E.g., Dake v. Timmons, 283 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1955); Parsley v. Parsley, 189 La.
584, 180 So. 417 (1938); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951);
Oldham v. Oldham, 135 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
5See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). But see Kovacs v. Brewer, 78 Sup.
Ct. 963, 966 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
6May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
7New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
8E.g., Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987 (1928); Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956).
9james v. James, 64 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1953); May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 520,
253 N.Y. Supp. 606, 608 (Ist Dep't 1931) (dictum).
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must have personal jurisdiction over the parents before it may render
a child custody decree that would be entitled to full faith and credit
in another state.-0 However, it does not follow from this decision
that the Court would hold that jurisdiction over the child is not
necessary.
Assuming that a child custody proceeding is in the nature of an
in rem action and that the child is the res over which the court
must have jurisdiction, a further jurisdictional question arises. Is the
physical presence of the child in the state all that is necessary? Some
courts have so held." Others have held that the domicile of the child
must be within the state before custody may be determined." z Domicile has been defined as the place where a person has voluntarily fixed
his habitation with the present intention to make it his permanent
home.' 3 In reality, however, an infant cannot be said to have voluntarily fixed his home. Thus, difficulties arise in the determination of
the domicile of a minor. If the child's parents are living together,
the child's domicile is that of his parents. 4 Upon the death of the
father, the domicile of the child is with his mother. 5 A minor abandoned by one parent has the domicile of the other parent. 6 In general, when the parents are separated, the domicile of a child is said
to be with his father. 7 Thus it may be seen that the domicile of an
unemancipated minor is little more than a confused legal fiction,
often difficult of determination. The reasoning behind the jurisdictional requirement of domicile is that the domiciliary state is better
suited than any other to comprehend and provide for the best interests of its children. A much more realistic approach would be to
leave the determination of the custody of children to the states in
which they actually reside.
Since different states have different jurisdictional requirements,
the question of which state's law governs becomes important. From
a literal reading of the full faith and credit clause and the implement'oMay v. Anderson, 345 US. 528 (1953).

1E.g., Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 Atd. 1 (1936); State ex rel. Ranken
v. Superior Ct., 6 Wash.2d 90, 106 P.2d 1082 (1940).
12E.g., Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927); Gafford v. Phelps, 235
N.C. 218, 69 S.E.2d 313 (1952).
1In
re Publicker's Estate, 385 Pa. 403, 123 A.2d 655 (1956).
.41n re Krayem, 177 Misc. 842, 32 N.Y.S.2d 70 (SunT. Ct. 1942).
"Ibid.
16Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951).
17Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927).
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ing statute,18 it would seem that the law of the state in which the
decree was rendered would govern. The state in which enforcement
is sought is required to give such faith and credit to the decree as
would be given it in the state from which it emanated. If, under the
law of the originating state, its court had jurisdiction and the decree
is valid and enforceable in that state, it should enjoy the same respect
in other states. On the other hand, it has been stated that a judgment or decree may be enforceable and valid in the state of its origin
and at the same time unenforceable in another state on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court. 19 If this is accepted,
it follows that the law of the state where enforcement is sought might
govern as to the jurisdictional requirements. Adoption of this latter
proposition would lead to great confusion in the child custody area.
The problem would then arise as to which of the several states would
recognize and enforce the decree and which would not. This confusion would be avoided by adopting the above reasoning based upon a
literal reading of the constitutional provision and the statute. Thus
the jurisdictional requirements of the law of the state in which the
decree was rendered, limited only by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, would determine the question of whether
the court had jurisdiction. This view is supported by cases not involving custody decrees.2 0 The United States Supreme Court has not
as yet resolved this problem in regard specifically to custody matters,
but it would probably follow the reasoning of the cases in other
fields.
When a party has participated in the proceedings of a court and
has been given an opportunity to contest the court's jurisdiction, the
requirements of full faith and credit bar him from collaterally attacking the decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister
state, the question of jurisdiction being res judicata.21 This doctrine
has not yet been applied to custody proceedings, but its applicability
seems apparent. The effect of this doctrine on a child custody case
may be illustrated by the following example:
1828 U.S.C. §1738 (1952).
19Grover 8. Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 295 (1890) (dictum); Husband v. Crockett, 195 Ark. 1031, 1038, 115 S.W.2d 882, 886 (1938) (dictum); Bonnet-Brown Sales Serv. v. Utt, 323 Mo. 589, 597, 19 S.W.2d 888, 891 (1929)
(dictum).
20E.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1937); Hanson v. Denckla, 78 Sup. Ct.
1228 (1958) (by implication).
2lSherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Ass'n,
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The courts of X state hold that it is not necessary for the child
to be before the court in order for it to render a valid child
custody decree. A mother seeks award of the custody of her
child in a proceeding in X state. The father appears and contests the award. The child at the time is in Y state. The court
of X state awards the custody to the mother. The mother then
goes to Y state and seeks to get physical custody of the child,
basing her claim on the decree of X state. The father resists
on the ground that the court of X state was without jurisdiction to render the decree. Even though the courts of Y state
hold that a child custody proceeding is in the nature of an in
rem action and that the child must be before the court, the
collateral attack by the father should not be allowed, since the
question of the jurisdiction of the court in X state is res
judicata.
This doctrine does not apply if the decree is subject to collateral attack in the rendering state; 22 in that case it would likewise be subject
to attack in the courts of a sister state.
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

The mandates of full faith and credit do not require that a sister
state give a more conclusive or final effect to a judgment than the
state in which it was rendered.23 Most states have statutes that allow
their courts to modify custody decrees that they have rendered.24
Therefore, since the courts of the state that rendered the decree could
themselves modify it, the courts of a sister state in which enforcement is sought can do the same on the basis of significant facts not
presented or considered at the original hearings.25 These facts will
most frequently take the form of changed circumstances arising after
the original decree was entered.
There is no fixed standard by which to determine what constitutes
a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of a
prior custody decree.26 It is often stated that the altered conditions
283 U.S. 522 (1931).
22Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).

23New York ex reL. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
24E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §32-705 (1948); MINN. STAT. §518.18 (1957); N.Y. CIv.
PRAc. Aar §1170.

25New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
2SElders v. Elders, 206 Ga. 297, 57 S.E.2d 83 (1950).
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must be of such a substantial and significant nature as to affect materially the welfare of the child involved.2 7 However, courts have
sometimes modified custody decrees on the basis of "changed circumstances" that seem of little significance. For instance, one court granted
2
modification on the basis of a lapse of eight months.
The danger exists that courts will use the "changed circumstances
rule" merely as a tool enabling them to refuse to give full faith and
credit to the decrees of sister states. One court warns of this danger:29
"As a finding of changed conditions is one easily made when
a court is so inclined, and plausible grounds therefor can quite
generally be found, it follows that the recognition extraterritorially which custody orders will receive or can command is
liable to be more theoretical than of great practical consequence."
Even though this danger exists, the "changed circumstances rule" is
necessary in order that stale and outdated decrees may be re-examined.
CONCLUSION

Courts generally agree that the prime consideration in child custody
cases is the welfare of the child. 30 The best interests of the child
require that some finality be given to custody decrees. As one writer
has stated, "stability of environment . . . in itself is an important
factor in the welfare of the child."' 1 To allow each state to determine

the custody of children regardless of previous determinations in other
states would be to create a highly dangerous situation. It would then
be possible that a child's custody would be constantly redetermined,
and that the child would be forced to move around like a pawn in a
chess game. The losing party in a custody case might be tempted to
"kidnap" the child and take him to another state in order to gain
another and possibly more favorable determination.
27

Heavrin v. Spicer, 265 Fed. 977 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So.2d
274 2 (Fla. 1954).
SPeopIe ex rel. Brown v. Schiff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
29
Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 492, 77 At. 1,6 (1910).
3OE.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1954); Pugh v. Pugh, 133 W. Va.
501, 56 S.E.2d 901 (1949).
3SStansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW
CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 829 (1944).
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The area of full faith and credit in regard to child custody decrees
is filled with confusion. The various states insist that there are different jurisdictional requirements that must be met before courts
may render valid decrees. Further, there is no minimum standard for
the sufficiency of changed circumstances that justifies a sister state in
modifying a custody decree. Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested a
32
possible solution:
"What in other countries has come to be known as 'extralitigious' proceedings, instituted and prosecuted by the state as
parens patriae without regard to the cooperation or the resistance of feuding parties, should perhaps be studied with a
view to eventual adoption by uniform legislative action. Under
such a procedure all courts in the United States would, on
their own initiative, cooperate in child custody cases, exchanging freely both information and assistance. Under such a
scheme there would be no doubt but that, while 'full faith
and credit' or comity is due in cases of attempted evasion,
otherwise any court must fully cooperate in any scrutiny to
which its decree may be subjected in any sister state."
This interesting suggestion, however, is probably impractical as an immediate solution of the problem. To be effective, the legislative action
would have to be truly uniform, and its success would depend upon
how many states would be willing to adopt it. It has been suggested
that an amendment to the Constitution giving Congress the power
to deal with the subject of marriage and divorce is perhaps the only
real solution of the problem of divergent state policies in regard to
divorce.33 This suggestion could also be applied to child custody matters. However, even assuming that such an amendment could be
passed, this, too, is a long-range solution and would be ineffective as
an immediate measure.
The problem of interstate recognition of child custody decrees is
principally a problem of the twentieth century. Formerly, when divorces were few in number and difficult to obtain, the question of enforcement of a child custody decree in a sister state rarely arose. But
today, with our increasing divorce rate, the problem is becoming of
more and more significance. Because of the important constitutional
32Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MicH. L. Ruv. 345, 372 (1953).
33Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overruled, 52 YALE L.J. 341 (1943).
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